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ANTITRUST: Use of the Judicial or Administrative
Adjudicatory Process Should be Exempt from
the Antitrust laws
Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co.'
Trucking Unlimited filed suit in federal district court alleging
violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 2 and seeking treble
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.8 On consideration of
the defendant carriers' motion to dismiss, the following allegations of
the complaint were taken to be true :' Trucking in the state of California is licensed and regulated by the California Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) 5 as well as by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 6 The PUC's policy has been readily to grant, and
to approve transfers of, common carrier licenses in the form of certificates of public convenience and necessity in order to encourage
competition among truckers.7 Until 1963 the ICC would register
any such certificate granted by the PUC without requiring a further
hearing." In 1961 California Motor Transport Company, the largest
highway common carrier in the western states, and the other defendant carriers embarked on a course of action designed to discourage smaller companies from seeking the easily obtainable cer1. 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964).
Section 1 of the Act provides, in part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal..
Section 2 of the Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
The section provides:

Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
4. 432 F.2d at 757. Since Trucking Unlimited came before the court on appeal
from the lower court's granting of defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted (FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6)), all allegations
of the complaint were taken as true for the purposes of the appeal. See 2A J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACICE 1 12.08 at 2266-67 (2d ed. 1968), cited by the Trucking Unlimited
appellate court at 757.
5. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1061-64, 1071 (West 1956 and Supp. 1971).
6. The Interstate Commerce Act requires that carriers travelling in interstate

commerce possess a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the ICC.
Interstate Commerce Act §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a), 208(a),.49 U.S.C. §§ 306(a)(1),
307(a), 308(a) (1964).
7. 432 F.2d at 762.
8. Id. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1071 (West 1956 and Supp. 1971), where
it is provided that the PUC has the power to prevent any vehicle from operating
without a certificate. The penalties for violation of the Commission's orders are set
forth in CA.. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2101 et seq. (West 1956).
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tificates from the PUC and ICC. The defendants established and
maintained a joint trust fund and told their competitors that the

trust fund would be used to oppose all applications filed by the competitors with the PUC or the ICC. The defendants further informed
their competitors that all such applications would be opposed with
or without probable cause and without regard to the merits of each
application. Opposition would be maintained through all available
steps of administrative and judicial review.9 The plaintiffs could not
afford to challenge the financial resources of the defendants and, as
a result, either the plaintiffs' applications were rejected or their ap-

proval was delayed or granted subject to restrictions. Competition
in the west coast trucking industry was severely restricted.'0
The district court dismissed the complaint," holding that the
doctrine established by the Supreme Court in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 12 - that attempts to
influence actions of public officials, even when made with the intent

to restrain trade, do not violate the antitrust laws - prevented the
defendants' conduct from constituting a Sherman Act violation. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,'"
holding that use of the judicial and administrative adjudicative process

is not protected from the operation of the antitrust laws by the Noerr
doctrine and that, even if Noerr does extend its protection to such ac-

tivities, the defendants' real purpose was not to induce governmental
action and therefore Noerr is inapplicable.' 4 This note will critically
examine the appellate court's holding and will analyze the impact

which that holding should have on similar litigation. 15
The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.,' 6 the Supreme Court defined a major exception to the
application of the antitrust laws. A group of Pennsylvania truckers
9. 432 F.2d at 762.

10. Id.
11. 1967 Trade Cas. 1 72,298 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
12. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
13. 432 F.2d at 763.

14. Id. at 757. But cf. Hays v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 420 F.2d 836
(9th Cir. 1969) ; Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341,
343 (9th Cir. 1969).
15. For a general background discussion of the type of conduct which the
Sherman Act is designed to control, see Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883
(9th Cir. 1938) ; United States v. National Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n, 40 F. Supp.
448 (D. Colo. 1941). See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
(1946). The American Tobacco Court restates the general rule that an unlawful
purpose can cause an otherwise lawful act to fall within the scope of prohibition
of the Sherman Act. "Acts done to give effect to the conspiracy may be in themselves wholly innocent acts....
[I]f they are part of the sum of the acts which are
relied upon to effectuate the conspiracy . . . they come within . . . [the statute's]

prohibition." Id. at 809. For additional discussions of the purposes of the Sherman
Act, see Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) ;
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500 (1940) ; Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 809 (1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
16. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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sued twenty-four eastern railroads and an association of eastern railroad presidents, contending that efforts by the defendants through a
publicity campaign and through lobbying to influence the Pennsylvania state legislature to enact legislation favorable to the railroads
and restrictive of the trucking industry, and to persuade the Governor
of Pennsylvania to veto legislation favorable to truckers, violated the
antitrust laws. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling
for the truckers, holding that joint action by individuals seeking to
persuade a legislature to enact a law, or the executive branch to act
in reference to legislation, does not violate the antitrust laws even if
the legislative or executive action will produce a restraint of trade.
Such conduct is not of a type which the Sherman Act was intended
to prevent.17 Since government is entitled to enact and enforce legislation which has the effect of restraining trade,"8 a judicial application of antitrust restrictions to these lobbying activities would hinder
government in the performance of its proper functions. The Court
refused to enlarge the scope of operation of the antitrust laws beyond
the regulation of business activities to include the restriction of such
political activities :'0 "[T]hese branches of government act on behalf
of the people . . . the whole concept of representation depends upon
the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold . . . that the people cannot freely inform the
government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a
purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a
purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history
of that Act. ' 20 The Court reasoned that the Sherman Act cannot
be interpreted as in any way restricting persons from informing a
legislature or an executive of their position on matters merely because
they have a financial interest in the decision of that body or person
whom their communication is intended to influence. 2 Indeed, said
the Court,
...it is quite probably people with just such a hope of personal
advantage who provide much of the information upon which
governments must act. A construction of the Sherman Act that
would disqualify people from taking a public position on matters
17. Id. at 136.
18. Governmental action which restrains trade is exempt from the operation
of the antitrust laws under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), discussed infra
in text at note 34 et seq.
19. 365 U.S. at 137. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690 (1962), where the Court reiterated that the Noerr doctrine applies
only to political acts. "Respondents were engaged in private commercial activity,
no element of which involved seeking to procure the passage or enforcement of laws.
To subject them to liability under the Sherman Act . . . would not remotely
infringe upon any of the constitutionally protected freedoms spoken of in Noerr."
Id. at 707-08. See also Schenley Indus. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirit Wholesalers
Ass'n, 272 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1967).
20. 365 U.S. at 137.
21. Id. at 137-38. "The right of the people to inform their representatives . . .
of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be
made to depend upon their intent in doing so." Id. at 139.
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in which they are financially interested would thus deprive the
government of a valuable source of information
. 2
And regardless of Congressional intent, application of the antitrust
laws to political activities could unconstitutionally restrict such persons in the exercise of their right to petition the government. As the
concept of representative democracy protects even those competitors
whose sole purpose in petitioning their government is to destroy
competition,2 3 the Sherman Act cannot be used to restrict persons from
taking a position on matters in which they have a financial interest.
On the other hand, the scope of the Noerr doctrine does not extend
to a situation in which the acts of the competitor are not really sincere
attempts to influence governmental action, but are a "mere sham"
disguising attempts to directly interfere with competition.24 In such
a case the Noerr doctrine would not be applied and such actions would
constitute violations of the Sherman Act.
Four years after its decision in Noerr, the Court was asked in
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,25 to apply its Noerr
ruling to activities which were not so obviously political. In order
to eliminate small competitors, certain large mining companies acted
with the United Mine Workers successfully to persuade the Secretary
of Labor to exercise his statutory authority 26 to set minimum wages
for employees of contractors selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority. The minimum wage set was higher than that set for other
industries, making it difficult for small companies to compete. They
also persuaded the TVA to reduce the number of its "spot purchases"
of coal from sources which were in large part exempt from the operation of the Secretary's order.
In holding that evidence of these
attempts to influence the Secretary of Labor and the TVA could not

22. 365 U.S. at 139.
23. Other cases utilizing the Noerr doctrine are United States v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440, 448 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1966); A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc.
v. Gray Line New York Tours, Corp., 242 F. Supp. 365, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(holding lobbying activities to be exempt from Sherman Act liability under Noerr);
Kennedy v. LIRR Co., 211 F. Supp. 478, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (holding that a
public relations campaign was not subject to the requirements of the Sherman Act,
in accordance with Noerr).
For a general discussion of the problems of lobbying and the role of lobbyists,
see Note, Application of The Sherman Act to Attempt to Influence Government
Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 847, 852-53 (1968) ; Comment, Improvement of the Legislative Process: Federal Regulation of Lobbying, 56 YALE L.J. 304, 306-11 (1947).
In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954), the Court explained
that the danger of lobbying is that special-interest groups will have greater influence
with Congress than will the general public. The dissent in Harriss discussed the
difficulty of controlling lobbying without interfering with the right to petition. Id.
at 636 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
24. 365 U.S. at 144. No specific definition of the term "sham" was provided
by the Court. For an article criticizing the Noerr decision, see 33 RoCKY MT. L. REv.
413 (1961). See also Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington
Defense, 66 MIcH. L. REV. 333 (1967) ; Note, Appeals to the Electorate by Private
Businesses: Injury to Competitors and the Right to Petition, 70 YALE L.J. 135
(1960) ; Note, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 777 (1958).
25. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
26. Under the Walsh-Healy Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35 et seq. (1964), the Secretary
of Labor has discretion to issue exemptions from the minimum-wage provision.
27. The main facts are set forth in 381 U.S. at 659-61.
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be used to show violation of the Sherman Act, the Court reiterated
its holding in Noerr that the presence of anti-competitive intent behind such political activity does not render that activity violative of
the Sherman Act.2 "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted
'29
effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose.
Trucking Unlimited posed the question of whether the NoerrPennington exemption from antitrust liability is applicable to the use
of the judicial or administrative adjudicatory process. Giving a
negative answer to this question, the Ninth Circuit concluded that,
under the rationale of Noerr and Pennington, the defendants' use of
the adjudicatory rather than the political process to effectuate a restraint of trade was not an activity which required exemption from
the operation of the antitrust laws.30 Courts do not determine whether
statutes should be. Recognition of the right to petition the legislature
or an executive in order to influence them in their determinations of
policy is not inconsistent with denying the Trucking Unlimited defendants protection from Sherman and Clayton Act liability for their
use of the courts in challenging their competitors. As judicial officials
do not act in a representative capacity," l the desire to protect the right
to engage in political petitioning which prompted the Noerr holding
does not demand protection of the defendants in their use of the
judicial process. 2
Although a series of post-Noerr decisions had held that particular uses of the adjudicative process were exempt from the prohibitions
of the antitrust laws under the Noerr doctrine, these decisions were
distinguished by the court as being instances of valid governmental
action, which is not subject to the antitrust laws.33 And the Ninth
28. Id. at 669.
29. Id. at 670. Even if, in approaching the Secretary of Labor, the defendant was
motivated by an intention to eliminate competitors, the conduct was not prohibited
by the Sherman Act. In 432 F. 2d at 759 n.5 the Ninth Circuit explained that
Pennington did not control its holding. Neither the actions of the Secretary nor
those of the TVA officials were adjudicatory in nature, and the defendant's activities
therefore fell within the political-acts exemption from Sherman Act Liability created
by Noerr. But the actions of the PUC and the ICC in Trucking Unlimited are
adjudicatory rather than political in nature, and thus the defendant's conduct in
seeking these actions does not conform to the requirement for Noerr-Pennington
immunity.
30. 432 F.2d at 758.
31. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-56 (1966); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941); Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Electric Co-op, Inc.,
394 F.2d 672, 684 (5th Cir. 1968) (interpreting Noerr as protecting resorts to the
legislative process).
See Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence
Government Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 847, 852-53 (1968), where it is concluded
that the availability of antitrust immunity for attempts to influence government
officials depends upon whether the particular officials act within a political or an
economic framework. The PUC and the ICC act within an economic framework.
32. The licensing procedure is an adjudicative rather than a legislative function.
432 F.2d at 758 n.4. But see the dissent, Id. at 763, which argues that the activities
of the PUC are closer to a legislative function and that, therefore, attempts to
influence these actions are protected by the Noerr-Pennington exception.
33. Id. at 760 n.7. See Woods Exploration & Production Co. v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 284 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Tex. 1968), rev'd and remanded in part, 438 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
In a pre-Noerr case, Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107
F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951), appeal dismissed sub nom., American Airlines, Inc. v.
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Circuit buttressed its verdict by employing an alternate theory: the
defendants' acts fell within the scope of the "sham" exception to
Aroerr, and the rationale of Noerr was therefore irrelevant. This holding apparently was based on the conclusion that in opposing the plaintiff truckers' applications the defendants did not reasonably expect
to win on the merits, either before the regulatory bodies or before
the courts. They sought to restrict competition by harassment, not
by influencing governmental decisions.
An analysis of whether Noerr-Pennington should apply to the
use of the judicial and administrative adjudicatory process, as urged
by the defendants in Trucking Unlimited, must be preceded by a determination of the standard to be used in applying Noerr. To do this
requires an ascertainment of the purpose of Noerr's protection
An implicit foundation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is the
concept that governmentally imposed restraints of trade are not violative of the antitrust laws. It might be argued that the leading Supreme Court decision on this point suggested that only restraints
specifically authorized by legislation are within this governmental
action exemption. In Parker v. Brown3 4 the Court refused to find a

violation of the Sherman Act in California's enforcement of an agricultural marketing scheme adopted by a state agency acting pursuant
to statutory authority, 35 even though such enforcement against the
plaintiff grower would injure his competitive positon vis-a-vis other
growers. Despite the fact that the carrying out of the scheme would,
if done by mere individuals, have violated the Sherman Act, the
Court held that "[w]e find nothing in the language of the Sherman
Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain
a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." 6 But later decisions have ignored this reference to the legislature, a reference which would seem to place severe limits upon the
breadth of the rule of Parker v. Brown, and there is no doubt that
this rule now embraces actions taken by regulatory agencies and
Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1953), the court held that the abuse of an adjudicatory
proceeding would be a violation of the Sherman Act.
In another pre-Noerr case, Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v.

Florida Light & Power Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954), the court held that use
of the adjudicatory process was not itself a violation of the Sherman Act. But,
according to the Ninth Circuit in Trucking Unlimited, that case involved valid
governmental action. 432 F.2d at 760 n.7. Perhaps the element that distinguishes
Trucking Unlimited from the cases cited at 432 F.2d 760 n.7 is that Trucking
Unlimited presents neither a case of mere governmental rule-making nor a case in
which government initiated the proceedings, as in Citizens Wholesale Supply Co. v.
Snyder, 201 F. 907 (3d Cir. 1913), cited in 432 F.2d 760 n.7. Rather, Trucking
Unlimited presented a case where government acted in response to litigation initiated
by private individuals on behalf of their private economic interests. As such, the
Trucking Unlimited court did not view the facts as warranting exemption from the
Sherman Act and Clayton Act prohibitions under the "governmental action" exception.
34. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
35. Id. at 351.
36. Id. at 350-51. Courts have consistently ruled that government action itself
is not regulated by the Sherman Act. In addition, the Eighth Circuit has held in
a recent case that "[g]enerally ...solicitation of governmental action in accordance
with a valid regulatory scheme for the sake of obtaining an economic or competitive
advantage is not prohibited by the antitrust laws." Central Say. and Loan Ass'n
v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 422 F.2d 504, 509 (8th Cir. 1970). Since the
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courts themselves - the governmental bodies involved in Trucking
Unlimited - in applying the law or in exercising their legally vested
discretion.8 Therefore, if the purpose of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is to immunize all attempts by others to obtain state-imposed
restraints which would themselves be immune, the first holding of
the Trucking Unlimited appellate court goes too far when it distinguishes between attempts to obtain legislative or executive action, on
the one hand, and attempts to detain judicial or administrative adjudicatory action, on the other.
The purpose of Noerr may be stated to be that of protecting all
political activity from antitrust law sanctions, regardless of the economic nature of the matter involved:
"The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena. Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution
in legislating with respect to problems relating to the conduct of
political activities. . . .""
In N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,39 the Supreme Court dealt with a Virginia
statute which forbade a lawyer's accepting legal business from a
person not a party to the proceeding. The Court noted that the
N.A.A.C.P.'s engagement of the attorney's services was not "a
technique of resolving private differences." Rather, it was "a form
of political expression."" The Court ruled that in such situations
access, free from restrictions, should be given to parties seeking to
use the courts.
It would not seem logical to allow parties free access to the courts
for the purposes of political expression and, likewise, freedom from
restraints upon their political activity, only when some "public" interest is involved, and to deny that access by binding them with the
restraints of the antitrust laws when only a patently private economic
interest is involved. That distinction cannot be material for purposes
individual's action follows a valid regulatory scheme, his action may be defined
as governmental action and is, therefore, not prohibited by the Sherman Act.
See also Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341,
343 (9th Cir. 1969); Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1970).
In Stroud v. Benson, 155 F. Supp. 482, 492 (E.D.N.C. 1957), vacated on
other grounds, 254 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 817 (1958),
the court explained that the achievement of the goal of the antitrust laws of furthering
competition is in the public interest and that, since the government is deemed to act
in the public interest, its actions cannot be considered to violate the antitrust laws.
It is the acts of individuals which the Sherman Act was intended to regulate. See
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51-62 (1911).
In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969),
the court found the transactions of the Blue Cross to be the acts of a private
corporation and not the acts of government; therefore, the activities of the Blue
Cross were not exempt from control by the antitrust laws.
37. 365 U.S. at 135-36, where the Noerr court held:
... no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to
influence the passage or enforcement of laws." Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51-62 (1911).
38. Id. at 141.
39. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
40. Id. at 429.
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of applying Noerr, for Noerr itself was a private economic interest
case. And in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar,41 the Supreme Court followed Button in allow-

ing the union to recommend attorneys to workmen with claims against
employers and found that a state cannot restrict the rights of citizens
to petition the courts. The Railroad Trainmen Court thus held that,
although the advancement of workers' economic interests was the
union's motive in seeking to utilize the court system, free access to
that court system could not be interfered with by the enforcement of
state bar regulations. But even if some "public" interest must be
found to make the right of free access to the courts superior to some
statutory restriction, it would seem that both Noerr and Trucking
Unlimited involved public interest questions concerning transportation policy and regulation of public utilities. As a matter of fact,
most court decisions on the law probably include policy determinations and, if made on the basis of societal values, involve "public"
interest.
Bracken's Shopping Center, Inc. v. Ruwe42 was a post NoerrPennington case challenging a suit which the defendant had filed
in an Illinois court to test the validity of a municipal ordinance
permitting construction of the plaintiff's shopping center. The plaintiff alleged that this use of the judicial process by the defendant
violated the antitrust laws. The federal district court read the NoerrPennington exception to exclude such action from the scope of the
antitrust laws' prohibitions and seemed to conclude that the Noerr
doctrine applies to both political and judicial activities: "[T]he general principle [is] that seeking lawful legislative, executive, or judicial
action does not violate the anti-trust laws . . . even if the purpose

and effect is to curtail competition.' 43
From Button and Bracken's Shopping Center emerges a standard indicating that, at least in matters where a public policy question
is presented, a party's good-faith resort to governmental process in
an attempt to obtain governmental action which is favorable to that
person, without the employment of illegitimate means for inducing
such a favorable decision, should not subject him to antitrust liability,
regardless of the person's private economic interest in the decision
or of a desire by him to obtain the favorable decision in order to
restrain trade. The defendant in Bracken's Shopping Center acted
ingood faith to test the validity of the law, and a good-faith test of
a law's validity does not violate the antitrust laws.4 The state trial
court had actually upheld the defendant's challenge to the municipal
ordinance, causing the Bracken's Shopping Center court to note that
"[a]t least one test of good faith is the existence of probable

cause ... .45

41. 377 U.S. 1 (1964). See UMWA v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
42. 273 F. Supp. 606 (S.D. Ill. 1967).
43. Id. at 607.

44. Citizens' Wholesale Supply Co. v. Snyder, 201 F. 907, 909-10 (3d Cir. 1913),
cited with approval in Bracken's Shopping Center, Inc. v. Ruwe, 273 F. Supp. 606,
607-08 (S.D. Ill. 1967).
45. 273 F. Supp. at 608.
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Commentators have argued that broad application of Noerr is
necessary to insure fulfillment of the purpose of the Noerr doctrine.4"
Trucking Unlimited does not further this position. The Trucking
Unlimited court was correct in stating that the defendants' alleged
use of the judicial and administrative adjudicatory machinery was
a "sham" designed to directly prevent the plaintiffs from utilizing the
state and federal licensing procedures, and that for this reason the
Noerr defense was unavailable to the defendants. But there does not
appear to be a legitimate basis for the court's broad alternate holding that Noerr does not protect any use of the judicial and administrative adjudicatory process.47 It is submitted that good-faith, genuine
attempts to secure favorable governmental action, including administrative and judicial decisions, should not give rise48to antitrust liability, at least where legitimate means are employed.
The Noerr sham exception is directed at apparent attempts to
influence governmental action where there is no real intent or expectation of receiving a favorable decision. Thus the bad faith which
would give rise to antitrust liability under this rule would not seem
to include an earnest attempt to secure a judicial or other governmental decision by bribery or other illegal means.49 But at present it
cannot be said with certainty that the use of illegal means in an otherwise good faith attempt to influence governmental decisions is in fact
within the protection of the Noerr doctrine.5 °
In its recent decision in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 1 the First Circuit could have decided that
the Noerr exemption was unavailable because of the bad means which
in that case were used to try to influence a public official's action.
Instead, the court denied the exemption on grounds which lend some
46. See Barnett, Joint Action by Committees to Influence Public Officials:
Antitrust Exemption or Trap?, 24 Bus. LAW 1097, 1106 (1967).
47. 432 F.2d at 762.
48. In Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
438 F.2d 1286, 1297 (5th Cir. 1971), the court cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Trucking Unlimited with approval in holding that the filing of false information
with the Texas Railroad Commission in order to restrain the plaintiffs from
competing in the gas production business was not an effort "to influence policy,
which is all the Noerr-Pennington rule seeks to protect." Id. at 1298. This is
consistent with our reasoning that only a lack of good faith or of legitimacy of
purpose will cause the defendants to lose the protection of Noerr. But see United
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561 (1944) ; Note, Antitrust: The Brakes Fail
on the Noerr Doctrine Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport
Company (N.D. Cal. 1967), 57 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 519 (1969), which indicate
that, ordinarily, only Congress may grant exemptions from the operation of the
Sherman Act.
49. It may be argued that inasmuch as there are no restrictions placed upon
the testimony of witnesses in court - in that even libelous or slanderous testimony
is permitted and protected in order to encourage people to participate in the judicial
process - free access to the courts should similarly be encouraged by exempting
the litigants from antitrust liability.
50. See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw.
U.L. REv. 705, 751 (1962), in which it is concluded that such actions should constitute violations of the Sherman Act. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911) ; Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib. Co., 353 F.2d 618
(10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966) ; United States v. American Can
Co., 230 F. 857 (D. Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921).
51. 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1971).
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support to the Ninth Circuit's view that the Noerr doctrine exempts
only attempts to influence policy makers. The defendant in Paddock
had attempted, through methods including "high pressure salesmanship," "fraudulent statements" and "threats, '52 to persuade a municipal government to purchase the product manufactured by the defendant rather than that of the plaintiff. Paddock's techniques included that of persauding the municipality to adopt specifications for
the type of product needed which could only be met by the defendant's product. The denial of the exemption was based in part on the
competitive bidding setting; the court reasoned:

Paddock's right to tout its wares to government agencies unlike
the right to seek legislation involved in Noerr, is purely a creature of statute and must be exercised within the confines of bidding procedures designed to insure the maximum possible competition for the government's expenditures. In the light of these
considerations, we see no constitutional objection to requiring
that Paddock observe the same limitations in dealing with the
government as it would in dealing with private consumers.53
More important to an analysis of the Trucking Unlimited decision, the Paddock court also held that Noerr protects approaches to
officials when "some significant policy determination" 5 4 is to be made,
but not mere competitive bidding for one minor product at the municipal level, even when that bidding involves attempts to influence

the municipality in its "technical decision about the best kind of weld
to use in a swimming pool gutter," 55 essentially a policy decision.
Paddock's use of the words "significant policy determination" may
have been an overstatement of the requirement, since the Paddock
court may have merely been attempting to distinguish between resorts to government acting in its proprietary capacity - the case in
Paddock where the municipality was building and operating a swimming pool - and government acting in its normal, governmental
capacity; the court held that a government acting as proprietor should
be dealt with by the defendant in the same way as the defendant would
have dealt with "private consumers." 50
But the court, in requiring the presence of a "significant policy
determination", may have been making a finer distinction, one between government acting in its governmental capacity to make "sig52. Id. at 29.
53. Id. at 34.
54. Id. at 32.
55. Id. at 32. The Paddock Court also recognized that the availability of the
Noerr defense depends upon the defendant's having made a real, good-faith effort
to procure a favorable governmental decision, while acknowledging that the fact
that some private economic interest is involved does not, by itself, preclude that
availability. In Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Local 150, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 440 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1971), the court held that Noerr-Pennington
does not "protect those who employ illegal means to influence their representatives
in government . .

.

. [T]here can be little reason to extend the special immunity of

Noerr and Pennington to a type of 'communication' which includes threats and other
coercive measures." Id. at 1099.
56. 424 F.2d at 34.
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nificant" policy decisions and government acting in the same capacity
to make technical decisions, such as those involved in the establishment of specifications. 57 This distinction appears to be invalid for
purposes of determining whether Noerr is applicable; since the establishment of standards is involved in the making of specifications,
Noerr should apply in the case of even technical decisions, as it did in
Pennington. Although some commentators have concluded that Noerr
is to be applied only to political and not to business activities, our
thesis is that business activities which utilize the political process are
not excluded per se from Noerr's protection."5
The Patent Cases
Cases closest to the question posed by Trucking Unlimited
whether use of the judicial or administrative adjudicatory process
may constitute a violation of the antitrust laws - involve patent litigation. Typical of these is Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.,5" in
which the defendant, charged with patent infringement, counterclaimed
that the patent holder had violated the antitrust laws through abuse
of its patent right. In answer to the counterclaim, the owner of the
patent argued that to allow "recovery of [antitrust] damages resulting
from the infringement action would be a denial of free access to the
courts."6 In holding that there was a violation of the antitrust laws,
the court stressed that the initiation of an infringement suit6 1 does not
per se violate the antitrust laws but that in certain circumstances such
initiation could be deemed a violation of those laws. "[T]he real
purpose of the infringement action and the incidental activities of
Kobe's representatives was to further the existing monopoly and to
eliminate Dempsey as a competitor."6 2
The patent statutes give a patent holder the express right to sue
for patent infringement in the federal courts. This right flows in turn
from another right: that to obtain a patent upon devices having certain characteristics. One obtaining a patent is given a statutory monopoly. Thus, mechanically at least, the patent scheme is simply a
regularized version of the type of situation under discussion throughout this paper: one person instigates the government to make a decision which favors him over his competitor while resulting in a
restraint of trade.
Trucking Unlimited suggests that the decision sought must involve a policy determination in order for the use of governmental
57. Id. at 29.

58. Household Goods Carrier's Bureau v. Terrell, 417 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1969).
See Comment, Whitten v. Paddock: The Sherman Act and the "Government Action"
Immunity Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 140, 151 (1971).
59. 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
60. Id. at 424.
61. The mere bringing of an infringement suit does not violate the antitrust
laws. The bringing of a suit must be a part of a general scheme to restrain trade,
and not merely an isolated act, in order for the restraint to be actionable. Virtue
v. Creamery Package Co., 227 U.S. 8, 37 (1913) ; International Visible Systems Corp.
v. Remington-Rand, Inc., 65 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1933). See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1964).
62. 198 F.2d at 425.
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process to be protected by Noerr. In the view of the Trucking Unlimited court, most judicial and many administrative decisions would
not involve policy making. It is perhaps arguable that patent cases do
not involve public policy determinations, but rather effect only the
immediate parties to the suit, and that for this reason the use of the
courts by a patent holder for the purpose of restraining trade is, on
its face, an activity which is not protected by Noerr from antitrust
liability. It is submitted that this view is inaccurate; a decision on
the question of whether to grant rights in a patent, and thereby to
determine the marketing procedure for a given product, does involve
considerations of public policy. A court's decision on the question
of whether an idea is sufficiently new or useful to merit protection
against its infringement is a typical law-fact decision in which the
trial judge exercises the same sort of discretion as does the Secretary
of Labor in finding a prevailing wage, the situation in Pennington.
In both situations the fact finder's conception of what is good public
policy can have an unquestioned influence on the decision. Thus
patent cases should be subject to the same rules as those governing
the availability of Noerr protection in other circumstances.
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.,63 the Supreme Court agreed that the initiation of a patent
infringement suit, in combination with other factors, could constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. If it could be proven that the
patent holder engaged in an intentional fraud upon the Patent Office
in order to obtain the patent which was the subject of the infringement suit, the holder would lose the immunity from antitrust liability
which the patent law otherwise would have given him. 4 But, significantly, the Court also held that "[b]y the same token, Food
Machinery's [the patent holder's] good faith would furnish a complete defense." '6 5 That is, if the holder's original acquisition of a
patent was without intentional fraud, its subsequent resort to the
judicial process for purposes of preventing infringement would not
cause the holder to incur antitrust liability, even though in fact the
patent might be annulable.6 6
By allowing one who is given a statutory right to utilize the
judicial process to do so without incurring antitrust liability if he
does so in good faith, the Supreme Court's decision in Walker suggests that the Ninth Circuit was indeed in error when it held in
Trucking Unlimited that a resort to judicial or administrative ad63. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
64. Id. at 177.
65. Id.
66. Additional patent decisions holding that violations of the antitrust laws
may result from the use of the judicial process, when other factors are present,
are United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Lynch v. Magnavox Co.,

94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938) (holding that a threat to sue can constitute a violation

of the antitrust laws in certain circumstances).
For a discussion of the patent cases, see Weinstein & Distler, Comments
on PreceduralReform; Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 533 (1969).

The Singer case involved a series of agreements arrived at between Singer and
competitors and the Magnavox case involved economic pressure through the threats
of addition patent litigation.
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judicatory process is not protected by the Noerr defense. Like the
patent statute, the Interstate Commerce Act expressly grants a licensee
the right to oppose the granting of a certificate to a competitor.
Under the Walker rationale, such opposition would be without risk
of antitrust liability if made in good faith. Of course, the defendants in Trucking Unlimited did not act in good faith. The Ninth
Circuit, dealing with the patent cases in Trucking Unlimited, does
not define any rationale for these cases themselves, but instead uses
them to show that, regardless of the substance of the litigation, use
of the judicial process can, under the right circumstances, constitute
a violation of the Sherman Act.6" But despite the Ninth Circuit's
treatment of the patent cases, their point seems clear: under the Walker
Court's dictum that "good faith would furnish a complete defense,""8
the patent decisions are in no way inconsistent with the conclusion of
our general analysis that use of the judicial and administrative process
should be immune from the antitrust law restrictions when those uses
are in good faith.
Implications of the Trucking Decision
Our conclusion that Noerr protects use of the courts and administrative agencies only if good faith is used has special significance
today in view of the widespread use of the political and judicial
process by conservationists and consumer groups seeking to restrain
certain business activities. Consumer groups and conservationists
may be exempt from the Sherman Act because of their noncommercial motives, a question outside the scope of this note.6 9 However,
this exemption is not firmly established and such groups would be
well advised to shape their activities so as to come within the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Conclusion
The Trucking Unlimited appellate court's holding that use of the
judicial and administrative adjudicative process can, regardless of
the defendant's motive in so using, violate the antitrust laws, is too
broad and conflicts with the basic purpose of the Noerr-Pennington
rule. The defendants in Trucking Unlimited clearly were not entitled
to the protection of the rule because their use of these processes was
a "sham." Although it is possible to say with absolute certainty only
that a party will be in no danger of incurring antitrust liability for
attempting to produce a governmental decision which will restrain
trade when that party is acting (1) in good faith (2) using legitimate
means (3) to effect a policy decision (4) by a governmental entity
67. 432 F.2d at 760.

68. 382 U.S. at 177.
69. For a discussion of the actionability of conduct undertaken for a commercial
purpose in Sherman Act cases, see Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman
Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 705 (1962). For a discussion of resort to the
antitrust laws as a consumer remedy, see Ladd, Consumers and Antitrust Treble
Damages, 79 YLE L.J. 254 (1969).
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acting in a non-proprietary capacity, in general good-faith attempts
to influence governmental actions, including even the setting of governmental standards, would be immune from antitrust liability under
Noerr-Pennington.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it may be possible to go
even further and conclude that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, with
its heavy emphasis and reliance upon a first amendment rationale,
will be immaterial in most cases. In Noerr, the railroads "conspired"
to influence others to take otherwise lawful action, specifically the
enactment of legislation. If they had "conspired" to get shippers of
steel to prefer the railroads through trade association advertising and
so forth, they would not be said to have violated the antitrust laws.
Only where they employed fraudulent, tortious, or other bad faith
means in attempting to influence actions of others would they be held
to have conspired to restrain trade. If the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine,
with its first amendment origins, does not immunize attempts to influence public officials by fraudulent, tortious or other bad faith means
or by sham efforts, then it may be difficult to find a case where the
doctrine does make a difference, since good faith attempts to influence
others are generally not within those actions prohibited by the antitrust laws.
Although the trend of the cases is clear, it is not yet certain
whether a conspiracy to restrain trade by, for example, bribing legislators to pass restrictive laws is protected by Noerr-Pennington. The
doctrine remains at least as a helpful, if somewhat obvious, addition
to the ideas expressed in Parker v. Brown. Just as restraints imposed
or sanctioned by law are not violative of the antitrust laws, so fair
and good-faith joint efforts to procure the imposition of such lawful
restraints through influencing public officials are not prohibited by
these laws.

